History of the World/History of the World (Bureau Development, Inc.)(1992).BIN/dp/0407/04071.txt

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Title:       Rise And Fall Of The Roman Republic
Author:      Mario, Jessie White

Rise And Fall Of The Roman Republic

1849

     When "Young Italy," the association of republican agitators led by
Giuseppe Mazzini, began its activities (about 1834), hatred of the Austrian
government, which ruled in several of the Italian States, was kept alive
through this determined organization.  Aspirations for liberty and
self-government were requickened.  The endeavors of the reforming Pope, Pius
IX (1846), to harmonize his policy with the aims of this party, in order to
promote a confederation of the Italian States under papal supremacy, at first
seemed to promise the dawn of a new era.  Soon after the outbreak of the
revolution of 1848 in France, revolt against the Austrian power began in
various parts of Italy.  The Austrian troops were driven out of Lombardy;
Venice compelled the Austrian forces in her territory to surrender, and became
a free republic; in a short time Italy appeared to have delivered herself from
the rule of Austria; but almost immediately the foreign power began to regain
its ascendency, and this, through the events here related, was fully
recovered.

     After the flight of Pius IX from Rome (November, 1848), Mazzini and his
followers pursued their own course.  A constituent assembly was summoned, and
on February 5, 1849, it declared the temporal power of the Pope abolished. The
Italian soldier who now becomes the chief figure of this movement has enjoyed
a popular renown unsurpassed by that of any of his countrymen. Giuseppe
Garibaldi, a sailor's son, was born in Nice, July 4, 1807.  In youth he went
to sea.  In 1834 he took part with Mazzini in the Young Italy demonstrations,
and for aiding in an attempt to seize Genoa he was condemned to death.
Escaping to South America, he won distinction as a guerilla leader and a
privateer in the service of the Rio Grande rebels against Brazil.  After
further military adventures in South America, he returned to Italy, and in
1847 offered his services to Pope Pius IX, but they were not accepted.  In
1848 he received indifferent treatment at the hands of Charles Albert of
Sardinia, who was besieging the Austrians in Mantua.  After the failure of
Charles Albert, Garibaldi collected his own followers and acted against the
Austrians with such effect as to bring him into prominence in the ranks of
Italian patriots.  The following account of the siege and defence of Rome,
which admiringly presents him to view, is from the author's supplement to
Garibaldi's Autobiography, and is a valuable contribution to the history of
the events in which he was so conspicuous.

     Of the many sublime pages traced in the blood of Italian patriots, the
sublimest in our eyes is that of the defence of Rome.  No writer of genius has
yet been inspired to narrate the heroic deeds enacted, the pain, privation,
anguish, borne joyfully to save "that city of the Italian soul" from
desecration by the foreigner.  Mazzini's beloved disciple, Mameli, the
soldier-poet, died with the flower of the student youth; the survivors,
exiled, dispersed, heartbroken, or intent only on preparing for the next
campaign, have left us but fugitive records, partial episodes, or dull
military chronicles.  Margaret Fuller Ossoli, competent by love and genius to
be the historian and who had collected the materials day by day, lived the
life of the combatants hour by hour, was wrecked with "Ossoli, Angelo" and her
manuscript, in sight of her native shore.

     From details that reached him Garibaldi always maintained that there was
a priest among the wreckers who secured and destroyed the treasure!
Guerrazzi's Siege of Rome is inferior to all his other writings.  The entry of
the Italian army into Rome by the breach in Porta Pia has cast the grand
defence of 1849 into the background of rash attempts and futile failures.  In
these brief pages we give merely the outline of the drama in which Garibaldi
was one of the leading actors.  The men who desired a republic did not exist
as a party in Rome previous to the flight of the Pope.  But there existed a
strong national anti-Austrian party, who, as they had worshipped Pio Nono
(Pius IX) when he "blessed Italy" and the banners that the Romans bore upward
to the "Holy War," now execrated him inasmuch as he had withdrawn his sanction
to that war and had blessed the Croats and the Austrians who were butchering
the Italians in the north.  Convinced of the impossibility of favoring the
independence and unity of Italy, and remaining at the same time the supreme
head of the Universal Church, Pio Nono fled for protection to the King of
Naples; there he declined to accept from the King of Piedmont his repeated
offers of protection or mediation, and appealed to Austria alone to restore
him pope-king absolute in Rome.  Very soon afterward the Archduke of Tuscany
revoked the Constituent Assembly which he had granted, and followed the
saintly example of the Holy Father, so that Tuscany and Rome were alike left
sheep without a shepherd.

     In the Roman States an appeal was made to universal suffrage, and the
people sent up deputies, known chiefly for their honesty and bravery, to
decide on the form of government, to assist Piedmont in her second war against
Austria.  When the Constituent Assembly met to decide on the form of
government, Mamiani warned them that only two rulers were possible in Rome -
the Pope or Cola di Rienzi; the Papacy or the Republic.

     Garibaldi, who had organized his legion at Rieti, was elected member of
the Constituent Assembly, and on February 7th put in his appearance and in
language more soldierlike than parliamentary urged the immediate proclamation
of the republic.  But the debate was carried on with all due respect for the
"rights of the minority."

     Finally, on February 9th, of the one hundred fifty-four Deputies present,
all but five voted for the downfall of the temporal power of the Pope, all but
eleven for the proclamation of the republic.  These, with the exception of
General Garibaldi and General Ferrari, were all Romans.  G. Filopanti, who
undertook to explain the state of affairs to the Roman people, won shouts of
applause by his concluding words, "We are no longer mere Romans, but
Italians."

     This sentence sums up the sentiments of all: of Garibaldi, who, after
recording his vote, returned to his troops at Rieti and drew up an admirable
plan for attacking the Austrians bent on subjugating the Roman Provinces and
for carrying revolution into the Kingdom of Naples; of Mazzini, who, so far
from having imposed on the Romans a republic by the force of his tyrannical
will, was - during its proclamation - in Tuscany, striving to induce Guerrazzi
and his fellow-triumvirs to unite with Rome and organize a strong army for the
renewal of the Lombard War.

     True, the Romans, mindful of all they owed to the great apostle of
Italian unity and independence, proclaimed him Roman citizen on February 12th,
and on the 25th of the same month the Roman people, with nine thousand votes,
elected him member of the Constituent Assembly; but it was not until March 5th
that he entered Rome, when, in one of his most splendid speeches, rising above
parties and politics, he called upon the "Rome of the People" to send up
combatants against Austria, the only enemy that then menaced Italy.

     Suiting the action to the word, he induced the Assembly to nominate a
commission for the thorough organization of the army; and ten thousand men had
quitted Rome and were marching up to the frontier to place themselves at the
orders of Piedmont, when, alas! their march was arrested by the news of the
total defeat at Novara, of the abdication of Charles Albert and the
reinauguration of Austrian rule in Lombardy.  Genoa, whose generous
inhabitants arose in protest against the disastrous but inevitable treaty of
peace, was bombarded and reduced to submission by La Marmora; and now, while
to Rome and to Venice flocked all the volunteers who preferred death to
submission, the new Holy Alliance of Continental Europe took for its
watchword: "The restoration of the Pope; the extinction of the two Republics
of Venice and of Rome."

     Austria crossed the Po and occupied Ferrara, marching thence on Bologna;
the Neapolitan troops from the south marched upward to the Roman frontier;
even Spain sent her contingent to Fiumicino.  But only when it was known that
the French Republic had voted an expedition, with the specious object of
guaranteeing the independence of the supreme Pontiff, did the Romans and their
rulers realize that the existence of Rome and her newborn liberties was
seriously menaced.  Garibaldi wrote from Rieti, in April, an enthusiastic
letter worth recording here:

     "Brother Mazzini: I feel that I must write you one line with my own hand.
May Providence sustain you in your brilliant but arduous career [Mazzini had
just been elected, with Armellini and Saffi, Triumvir of Rome], and may you be
enabled to carry out all the noble designs in your mind for the welfare of our
country.  Remember that Rieti is full of your brethren in the faith, and that
immutably yours is

"Joseph Garibaldi."

     At the same time he sent a plan, proposing to march along the Via Emilia,
to collect arms and volunteers, proclaim the levy in mass, and with a division
stationed in the Bolognese territory, operate in the duchies, unite Tuscan,
Ligurian, and Piedmontese forces, and once more assail the Austrians. But the
news of Piedmont defeated, Genoa bombarded and vanquished, convinced him that
it would be difficult to re-arouse the disheartened population of Northern
Italy.  Hence he next proposed to cross the Neapolitan frontier, fling himself
upon the royal troops, and seize the Abruzzi.  A sensible project this, to
take the offensive against the Pope's defenders.  But before the Triumvirate
could come to a definite decision, it was known that the French troops, by a
disgraceful stratagem, had landed and taken possession of Civita Vecchia,
General Oudinot entwining the French flag with the Roman tricolor and assuring
the Romans that they only came to secure perfect freedom for the people to
effect a reconciliation with Pius IX.

     But the people had no desire for such reconciliation; the Assembly
decreed that Rome should have no garrison but the National Roman Guard: that
if the Republic were invaded by force, the invaders by force should be
repelled.  A commission of barricades established, the people flocked to erect
and remained to man them.  The National Guard summoned by Mazzini all
answered, "Present," and served enthusiastically throughout the siege; all the
troops dispersed in the Provinces were summoned to the capital, and Garibaldi
and his volunteers marched into the city amid the acclamations of the
populace, too thankful to welcome them to demur at the strange appearance they
presented.

     Now that Garibaldi's military and naval genius is fully recognized, and
the extraordinary fascination he exercised over officers and men, the
enthusiasm with which he filled whole populations whom others failed to stir,
are undisputed, many historians and critics have expressed their astonishment
that he was not made at once commander-in-chief of the Roman forces, and have
blamed the Triumvirate for having failed to recognize in the hero of
Montevideo the good genius of Rome.  Such critics must be simply ignorant of
the actual condition of Rome and her Government.  There existed, in the first
place, the regular Roman army, which would have served under none save regular
generals; then there was the Lombard battalion under Manara, whose members,
after fifteen months of regular campaigning, were thoroughly drilled and
disciplined, who insisted on retaining the cross of Savoy on their belts, and,
until their prowess made them the idols of the Romans, were nicknamed the
"corps of aristocrats."

     Little did they imagine, when they kept aloof from the legion, that
before three months were over their young hero chief would resign his command
of them to assume the delicate post of head of Garibaldi's staff.  Carlo
Pisacane - educated in the military college of the Nunziatella, who had served
as captain in the foreign legion in Algiers, destined later to become the
pioneer of Garibaldi and his "Thousand" and to lose his life in the attempt -
while recognizing Garibaldi's prowess and talents as a guerilla chief, in his
military history of 1849, severely criticises his tactics, and blames his
sending up "a handful of boys against masses of the enemy" and censures,
unhesitatingly, "his indiscipline at Velletri." One of the Deputies of the
Roman Constituent wrote to the Triumvirate begging them to "Send Garibaldi
with his motley crew to a terrible spot, called For del Diavolo, between
Civita Vecchia and Rome; on no account to allow them to enter the city, as
they are quite too disorderly."

     Now, they had committed no "disorders" save that of carrying off the
mules and horses of the convents; but when we think of the wild, free,
peril-scorning life led in the backwoods of America, of how they recognized no
law save their commander's orders, how little used he had been to receive
command from any, it will be easily understood how this wild, tanned, quaintly
dressed band filled the inhabitants of the towns through which they passed
with terror and dismay.  Garibaldi's violent tirades against priests and
priestcraft; the liberation of a gang of miscreants arrested by order of the
Roman Government, had not prepossessed men of order and of discipline in his
favor; and although personal contact dispelled all unfavorable prepossessions,
one sees how impossible it was for Mazzini to place him in the position which
he would himself have assigned to him.

     Garibaldi altered in nothing his South American modes of warfare.  He and
his staff, in red shirts and ponchos, with hats of every form and color, no
distinctions of rank or military accoutrements, rode on their American
saddles, which when unrolled served each as a small tent.  When their troops
halted and the soldiers piled their arms, the General and all his staff
attended each to the wants of his own horse, then to securing provisions for
their men.  When these were not at hand, the officers, springing on their
barebacked horses, lasso on wrists, dashed full speed along the Campagna, till
oxen, sheep, pigs, kids, or poultry in sufficient quantities were secured and
paid for; then, dividing their spoil among the companies, officers and men
fell to killing, quartering, and roasting before huge fires in the open air.

     Garibaldi, when no battle was raging or danger near - if in the city,
selected some lofty belfry-tower; if in the country, climbed the loftiest
peak; and, with brief minutes of repose under his saddle-tent, literally lived
on horseback, posting his own pickets, making his own observations, sometimes
passing hours in perfect silence, scanning the most distant and minute objects
through his telescope.  Ever a man of the fewest words, a look, a gesture, a
brief sentence sufficed to convey his orders to his officers.  When his
trumpet signalled departure, the lassos served to catch the horses grazing in
the fields, the men fell into order and marched, none knowing nor caring
whither, save to follow their chief.  Councils of war he never held; he
ordered, and was implicitly obeyed.  To his original legion were added some of
the finest and bravest of the Lombard volunteers, who had learned his worth
"after the armistice"; while boys from ten to fourteen, who were his pride and
delight, formed his "band of hope."

     To-day for an act of courage a man would be raised from the ranks, and,
sword in hand, command his company; but woe to him if he failed in shouldering
a musket or brandishing a bayonet at need.  To onlookers this legion, composed
at first of but one thousand men, seemed a wild, unruly set; but this was not
the case.  Drunkenness and insubordination were unknown among the ranks.  Woe
to a soldier who wronged a civilian.  Three were shot for petty theft during
the brief Roman campaign.  Still, while Garibaldi felt within himself his own
superiority to those around, Mazzini, who also felt it, might as well have
proposed an Indian chief to command the Roman Army as this man, whom, in later
years, no soldier in Europe but would have been proud to call dux.

     Again, it must not be forgotten that the grounds on which France
explained her interference was the imposition by "foreigners" of a republic on
the Roman people, desirous only to receive the Pope with opne arms; that
Austria, Piedmont, and the Ultramontane faction in England represented that
Roman States as handed over the demagogues, to the riffraff of European
revolutionists.  Hence the absolute necessity that presented itself to the
minds of the Triumvirs for filling the civil and military offices as far as
possible with citizens of Rome or the Roman States.  Unfortunately, no capable
Roman commander-in-chief existed.  Rosselli was chosen as the least incapable;
but throughout, Garibaldi was regarded as the soul, the genius of the defence.

     A very short time had sufficed for Mazzini and the Romans to come to so
perfect an understanding that no exercise of authority, no police force, was
necessary to keep order in the city, as the French, English, and American
residents, and as the respective consuls repeatedly affirmed in public and in
private letters.  Oudinot too had warning from his own consul, from his own
friends within the city, of all the preparations, of the resolute
determination of the inhabitants, of the known valor of many of the combatants
in past campaigns; yet to all such remonstrances he answered with French
impertinence, "Les Italiens ne se battent pas," and clearly he had imbued his
officers with this belief.  At dawn on April 30th, starting from Castel di
Guido, leaving their knapsacks at Magnianella, the officers in white gloves
and sheathed swords advanced on Rome, taking the road to Porta Cavallaggieri,
sending sharpshooters through the woodlands on the right, the Chasseurs de
Vincennes on the heights to the left.  Avezzana, war minister, from the top of
the cupola of San Pietro in Montori, on seeing the first sentinel advance,
gave the signal for the ringing of the tocsin, which brought the entire
populace to the walls, the Roman matrons clustering there to encourage their
husbands, sons, and brothers to the fight.

     When the army arrived within a hundred seventy yards from the wall, the
artillerymen from the bastions of San Marto fired their first salute, to which
the Chasseurs de Vincennes responded so well that the Roman Narducci, Major
Pallini, and several of his men fell mortally wounded at their guns. Finding
themselves under a cross-fire from the walls and from the Vatican, the enemy
placed a counter-battery, which did deadly mischief to the besieged, who lost
at once six officers, numerous soldiers, and had a cannon dismounted to boot.
Not the slightest confusion occurred; women and boys carried off the wounded;
fresh soldiers took the place of the fallen; compelling Oudinot to summon both
his brigades and plant two other pieces of cannon.  But he now had to cope
with an enemy whom Frenchmen in Montevideo envied and calumniated; who to
himself and his followers was as yet an unknown quantity.

     Garibaldi, who had but two days to organize his men and take up position,
had at once perceived the importance of the scattered buildings outside the
gates, and occupied them all - villas, woods, and the walls surrounding them.
As the enemy fell back from the first assault, he flung his men upon them as
stones from a sling.  At the head of the first company was Captain Montaldi,
who in a short time was crippled with nineteen bullets, yet still fought on
his knees with his broken sword; and only when the French retreated did his
men carry him dead from the field.  As fought his company, so fought all under
the eyes of Garibaldi, who directed the fight from Villa Pamphilli.  Then
summoning his reserve, himself heading the students who had never seen fire
but who had given each to the other the consign, "If I attempt to run away,
shoot me through the head," he led them into the open field, and there gave
them their first lesson to the cry of, "To the bayonet! to the bayonet!" - a
lesson oft repeated since, a cry never after raised in vain.  Numbers of his
best officers and soldiers fell, but never a halt or panic made a pause in
that eventful charge, until in full open fight the French were compelled to
retreat, leaving Garibaldi absolute master of the field.

     Numbers of the French were killed and wounded, others hid themselves in
the woods and vineyards round; a general retreat ensued, while a portion
continued the fire to protect it.  The guns had to be carried off by hand, as
four horses had been killed; and at this retreat up to Castel di Guido,
General Oudinot was forced to assist in person.  Summing up his losses, he
found that he had left four hundred dead upon the field; five hundred thirty
wounded, and two hundred sixty prisoners.  He had, besides, the glory of
depriving the Roman Republic of two hundred fourteen killed and wounded,
twenty-five officers among them, and of carrying off one prisoner, Ugo Bassi,
the chaplain, who had remained behind to assist a dying man, his only weapon
being the cross, of which the French were the knightly protectors.

     Garibaldi's first thought was naturally to pursue the fugitives to Castel
di Guido, to Pali, and Civita Vecchia; "To drive them," in his own forcible
language, "back to their ships or into the sea." For this he demanded strong
reenforcements of fresh troops.  But the Government of Rome - believing that
it sufficed for Republican France to know that Republican Rome did not desire
the return of the Pope; that it was not governed by a faction - was resolved
unanimously to resist all invasion; decided against pursuit; sent back the
French prisoners to the French camp; accorded Oudinot's demand for an
armistice, and entered into negotiations with the French plenipotentiary,
Ferdinand de Lesseps, for the evacuation of the Roman territory.

     The refusal was never forgotten, never forgiven by Garibaldi, and has
always been a "burning question" between the exclusive partisans of Mazzini
and Garibaldi, in whose eyes to scotch and not to kill the snake was the
essence of unwisdom.  It is also maintained by many Garibaldians that an
out-and-out victory could not have been concealed from the French Assembly as
the President and his accomplices did manage to conceal the affair of April
30th, and that had the people and the army in France known what a humiliation
had been inflicted on their comrades they would have insisted on the recall of
Oudinot, and that thus the President's own position would have been
endangered.  On the other hand, Mazzini's partisans say, granting - what
remains unproven - that Garibaldi could have succeeded in driving every
Frenchman back to his ships or into the sea, there can be no doubt that Louis
Napoleon, bent on restoring the Pope and thus gaining the clergy to his side,
would have sent reenforcements upon reenforcements, until Rome should be
vanquished.

     The disputants must agree to differ on this point, though all surely must
allow that it was necessary that the small forces at the disposal of the
Republic should be husbanded for the repulse of others besides France, who
claimed to be defenders of the Pope - Austria, the King of Naples, and even
Spain!  And, in fact, a Neapolitan army, with the King at their head, had
crossed the Roman frontier, and had taken up positions at Albano and Frascati,
whence Garibaldi was sent to oust them, the Lombard brigade being added to his
legion.  This Neapolitan king-hunt formed one of the characteristic episodes
of the Roman campaign.  Garibaldi usually lodged his men in convents, to the
terror and horror of their inmates, sending them thence to reconnoitre the
enemy's positions, and harass them by deeds of daredevil courage.

     The King was indeed at Albano, whence from Palestrina Garibaldi marched
to the attack; which would probably have been successful had he not been
suddenly summoned back to Rome, as the movements of the French were by no
means reassuring.  However, a fresh truce being proclaimed, General Rosselli,
with Garibaldi under his orders, was sent out again in full force against the
Neapolitans.  Not a wise arrangement this, as the volunteers and the regulars
- unless at different posts within the city - had not yet united in harmonious
action.  Garibaldi, sent by Rosselli merely to explore the enemy's movements,
finding that they were retreating from Albano, gave battle to a strong column
about two miles from Velletri without giving time to Rosselli to come up with
the main body.

     So the Neapolitans got into Velletri, barricaded themselves there, and,
escaping during the night by the southern gate, recrossed the Neapolitan
frontier, the King foremost in the van.  Rosselli and the regulars complained
loudly that this disobedience to orders had prevented them from making the
King of Naples prisoner, the Garibaldians maintaining on their side that this
would have been effected had the regulars thought less about their rations and
come to the rescue when first they heard the distant shots.  Messengers sent
by the generals to the Triumvirate bore the complaints of each. Rosselli was
recalled, and Garibaldi left with full liberty of action.  But when the French
Government disavowed their envoy-extraordinary - the patriotic, able,
straightforward De Lesseps - instructing Oudinot to enter Rome by fair means
or by foul, sending enormous reenforcements, promising to follow up with the
entire French army if necessary, what could they do but recall Garibaldi with
all possible despatch?  Was it not a proof of their confidence in him?
Moreover, on Garibaldi's return to Rome, Mazzini made a last effort to induce
him to unburden his mind, at least to himself, by asking him in writing to
tell him frankly what were his wishes.  Here is the laconic answer,
characteristic of the writer; frank and unabashed as the round, clear
handwriting of the original, from which we copy:

                                   "Rome, June 2d, 1849.

     "Mazzini: Since you ask me what I wish, I will tell you.  Here I cannot
avail anything for the good of the Republic, save in two ways: as dictator
with unlimited plenary powers, or as a simple soldier.  Choose!

          "Unchangingly yours,

               "Giuseppe Garibaldi."

     Again, Garibaldi disapproved the conduct of Mazzini and the Triumvirate
because they refused to allow any acts of violence against religion or the
professors of religion.  They had abolished the Inquisition, and used the
edifice to house the people driven from their homes by the siege; had invited
and aided monks and nuns to return to their homes and to lead the life of
citizens.  But they had not allowed the confessionals to be burned in the
public market-place.  A wretch named Zambianchi, who ill-treated some
inoffending priests, was severely punished "for thus dishonoring the Republic
and humanity." Moreover, the Easter ceremonies were celebrated as usual; the
Triumvirate and the Assembly stood among the people in the church and in the
square to receive the blessing from the outer balcony of St. Peter's.

     All this gave umbrage to Garibaldi, but no hypocrisy and much wisdom
inspired these acts.  In the first place, the Triumvirate, and especially
Mazzini, the most religious man we have ever known, were well aware that,
while the temporal power of the papacy might be destroyed by fire and sword,
the spiritual power of the Roman Catholic hierarchy could be extinguished only
in the name of a moral law recognized and accepted as being higher and more
authoritative than any other intermediary between God and the people - they
knew that ideas can be vanquished only by ideas.  Again, as the responsible
heads of the Roman Republic, the Triumvirs were wisely careful not to offend
the hearts and consciences of Catholics abroad.  Finally, the very fact that,
with four armies at their gates, life, its feasts and fasts, its workdays and
holidays, could go on as usual, was one highly calculated to strengthen the
Romans' faith in and affection for the new Government.  No crimes were
committed; the people came to the Triumvirs as children to their fathers, and
- for Italians a very remarkable thing - they not only paid down current
taxes, but they paid up arrears.

     From Garibaldi's brief account, it would almost seem that the Triumvirate
and the Assembly surrendered Rome before absolute necessity constrained them
so to do.  He does not tell us how, when the French had actually entered Rome
by the breach, he alone of all the civil and military commanders refused to
head the troops to attack the invaders in possession. He gave his own reasons,
very wise ones it seems to us, in writing many years later, but in his Memoirs
he seems to have forgotten them.  The terrible tidings that the seventh
bastion and the curtain uniting it to the sixth had fallen into the hands of
the French spread through the city.  The Triumvirate had the tocsins rung.
All the houses were opened at that sound; in the twinkling of an eye all the
inhabitants were in the streets.  General Rosselli and the Minister of War,
all the officers of the staff, Mazzini himself, came to the Janiculum.

     "The people in arms massed around us," writes Garibaldi in a short record
of the siege of Rome, "clamored to drive the French off the walls. General
Rosselli and the Minister of War consented.  I opposed the attempt. I feared
the confusion into which our troops would have been thrown by those new
combatants and their irregular movements, the panic that would be likely by
night to seize on troops unaccustomed to fire, and which actually had assailed
our bravest ones on the night of the 16th.  I insisted on waiting for the
daylight."

     He here narrates the daring but unsuccessful attempt of the Lombard
students, who flung themselves on the assailants, and who had gained the
terrace of Casa Barberini, and continues: "But at daylight I had counted the
forces with which we had to contend.  I realized that another June 3d would
bereave me of half of the youths left to me, whom I loved as my sons.  I had
not the least hope of dislodging the French from their positions, hence only a
useless butchery could have ensued.  Rome was doomed, but after a marvellous
and a splendid defence.  The fall of Rome, after such a siege, was the triumph
of democracy in Europe.  The idea of preserving four or five thousand devoted
combatants who knew me, who would answer at any time to my call, prevailed.  I
ordered the retreat, promising that at five in the evening they should again
advance; but I resolved that no assault should be made."

     From this and other writings of Garibaldi it is clear that from the night
of June 21st he considered any further attempt to prevent the French from
entering Rome as worse than useless - that hence he refused to lead the
remnants of his army "to butchery" on the breach.  How, then, was it possible
for Mazzini to have retarded the catastrophe indefinitely, and reserved to
Rome "the glory of falling last," i.e., after Venice and Hungary?

     Mazzini, beside himself with grief that the armed people had not been
allowed to rush on to the bastions and drive the French from the walls, wrote
a reproachful letter to Manara, then chief of Garibaldi's staff, and this
patriot here seems to have kept the peace, as on the 25th we find a friendly
letter from Garibaldi to the Triumvirate in which he proposes to leave Manara
in Rome, and to conduct, himself, a considerable number of his men out of Rome
to take up position between the French and Civita Vecchia, to harass them in
the rear.  And on the same day, evidently after a meeting and the acceptance
by Mazzini of Garibaldi's project, the latter writes:

                         "June 26th, 8 p.m.

     "Mazzini: I propose, therefore (dungue), to go out to-morrow evening.
Send me to-morrow morning the chief who is to assume the command here.  Order
the general-in-chief to prepare one hundred fifty mounted dragoons, who, with
the fifty lancers, will make up two hundred horse.  I shall take eight hundred
of the legion, and to-morrow shall send them to change their shirts [i.e.,
doff their 'red' for 'gray'].  Answer at once, and keep the plan a profound
secret."

     The attempt was not made, probably because it was impossible to march out
secretly from any gate, and Manara writes from Villa Spada, 1 p.m. on the same
day:

     "Citizen Triumvir: I have received your letter.  I am somewhat better and
at my post.  I have spoken with Pisacane [chief of Rosselli's staff]; we are
perfectly agreed.  Both animated by the same spirit, it is impossible for
petty jealousies to come between us.  Be assured of this.  I have begged
General Garibaldi to return to San Pancrazio, so as not to deprive that post
at this moment of his legion and his efficacious power.  He promises me that
before dawn all will be here.  Everything is quiet.

                         "Manara."

     This was Manara's last letter to Mazzini; at that same Villa Spada the
yearned-for bullet pierced his heroic heart.  Manara died as the barbarians
entered Rome.

     And here, to all appearances, is Garibaldi's last letter written in Rome
to Mazzini:

     "We have retaken our positions outside San Pancrazio.  Let General
Rosselli send me orders; this is now no time for change.

                    Yours,

                         "G. Garibaldi."

     No time for anything but one last desperate onslaught at the point of the
bayonet, Garibaldi in the foremost ranks with sword unsheathed, while Medici
from Villa Savorelli renewed the wonders of the Vascello.  Twice the
assailants were driven back to their second lines; thrice they returned in
overpowering numbers; but, gaining the gate, they were received with volleys
of musketry from the barricades at the ingress to Villa Spada and Savorelli.
There fell the flower of the Lombards; boys of the "band of hope"; Garibaldi's
giant negro, faithful, brave Anghiar; six hundred added to the three thousand
four hundred corpses on which the soldiers of La Grande Nation reconstructed
the throne of the supreme Pontiff, and guarded it with their bayonets until
the sword of their self-chosen master fell from his trembling hands at Sedan.